In June 2020, a bloody border conflict broke out between India and China in the Ladakh region—the deadliest since the 1962 war. Relations between the nuclear-armed neighbors have reached their lowest level in decades. But, after four years of frozen bonds, the relationship begins to thaw.
India and China reached a border agreement last month that calls for the resumption of patrols in Ladakh, as well as the withdrawal of troops returning to positions in the troubled areas. The agreement likely paved the way for the October 23 meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping—the first since the Ladakh conflict in 2020—on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia. They are committed to strengthening communication and cooperation.
These changes provide an opportunity to move forward. New Delhi has long insisted that relations cannot improve until border tensions are eased; that condition has been met. Both sides can also use leverage to fully tap into existing areas of cooperation. Trade relations remain strong despite deep tensions, and the goodwill generated by the border agreement could open up more Chinese investment in India. New Delhi and Beijing work together in many international forums, from BRICS to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. They share many common interests, from fighting terrorism and promoting international cooperation to embracing non-Western economic methods—and rejecting what they see as conflicting U.S. morals around the world.
A lasting peace between the two Asian giants will have far-reaching consequences, including Washington’s cooperation with New Delhi—driven by a shared goal of countering Chinese power. But it could also serve as a hedge against the unpredictability of President-elect Donald Trump, should he decide to abandon his hard-line approach to Beijing and seek to meet with Xi — a leader Trump has often admired, including as recently as last month.
Yet the importance of melting cannot be overemphasized. That’s because India’s relationship with China is still very fraught, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.
The Ladakh agreement, for example, has done nothing to resolve the broader India-China border dispute. The countries share a 2,100-mi. border, disputed 50,000 square miles—an area about the size of Greece. Additionally, mistrust among border troops remains high; The painful memories of the Ladakh war—which involved Indian soldiers being beaten to death with iron rods, and thrown into icy rivers to their death—still haunt.
Tensions are high in other areas as well. The massive project of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which New Delhi completely rejected because it passes through the so-called Indian territory, remains a landmark. India is also concerned about the visibility of Beijing’s naval power in the Indian Ocean, which stretches eastward over a vast expanse from China’s military base in Djibouti to what New Delhi believes are Chinese spy ships operating near the Andaman Sea, where India has islands. Closer to home, New Delhi is concerned about the surveillance risks posed by Chinese technology in India.
In addition, India and China have strong security ties with each other’s rivals. Thanks to a series of basic defense agreements, the militaries of India and the US are cooperating at unprecedented levels, and increasing arms sales and technology transfers. India has now become a security provider for the US, supplying Washington with military equipment and helping its allies deal with Chinese provocations. The US has provided intelligence to New Delhi at critical times. On the other hand, Beijing continues to pursue its longstanding security alliance with Islamabad. It provides significant military aid to Pakistan, including missile systems (which have produced a number of recent US sanctions).
Meanwhile, India and China also have major differences on important issues. Beijing rejects many of India’s policies in Kashmir, a disputed region that has sparked several India-Pakistan wars. India is strengthening ties with Taiwan, which Beijing sees as a renegade Chinese province. The Dalai Lama—the exiled leader of Tibet, whom Beijing views as a dangerous separatist—has long been based in India. India and China are also each part of the global rivalry arena: India participates in the Indo-Pacific Quad, while China leads the BRI.
However, bilateral relations should continue to improve. Continued border talks—which have been happening regularly since the Ladakh crisis—to discuss other points, and to ensure mutual commitment to the old non-proliferation agreements, could help prevent future escalation. The next opportunity for high-level talks may come this month, when Modi and Xi attend the G20 summit in Brazil.
The best hope for a deeper relationship lies in their strong economic ties (China was India’s top trading partner last year). India’s top economic adviser is making the case for more Chinese FDI that could accelerate Beijing’s long-term plans to invest in India’s top industries. And China, with its recent economic woes, would benefit from expanding ties with the world’s fastest growing economy.
The coming return of Trump could also stimulate more India-China businesses, if their collective fear of US tariffs prompts them to set aside more trade space.
Ultimately, the relationship will sometimes be cooperative, especially economically, but it will always be competitive—and possibly sometimes conflictual. Still, even a small India-China thaw is a good thing. The world is on fire, and it can’t handle another crisis—let alone a conflict.
Source link
