Analysis: Russia, Iran strengthen alliance after Syria retreat | Political Affairs

Iran and Russia have finalized a long-delayed cooperation agreement, strengthening ties between the two countries even as both face growing geopolitical pressures.

The 20-year agreement, signed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Friday, boosts military and defense cooperation, and includes a clause that says no country will allow its territory to be used for any action that could threaten security. to another, or give any assistance to any party attacking any country.

Such an agreement has been talked about for years, but current events have made the need for an agreement even more pressing.

In Russia, the war in Ukraine has disturbed its position in the country, while Iran, in addition to Moscow, has been facing Western sanctions and the outbreak of attacks on Israel and the weakening of its few allies in the region, as well as collapse. of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in early December.

Undoubtedly, it is Syria that has provided an important impetus to the strengthening of relations, as both countries have lost an important ally in al-Assad, weakening their influence in the wider Middle East.

Both Moscow and Tehran were ultimately willing to release al-Assad, caught off guard by the opposition’s advance. But now they seem committed to strengthening their bilateral relations.

The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement during Pezeshkian’s official visit to Moscow shows that.

The agreement is built not only on Russian-Iranian cooperation regarding Ukraine and efforts to avoid Western sanctions, but also on the North-South Transport Corridor – a move promoted by Moscow to facilitate trade from Asia to Russia.

This route, designed to bypass the country’s bottlenecks such as the Suez Canal and the Baltics, favors a tunnel through Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea.

Syria as a catalyst

Before the start of the war in Syria in 2011, both Moscow and Tehran had their own strategic relationship with Damascus.

Russian cooperation was strengthened in the Tartous naval base, which was established in 1971 to generate power across the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim airbase, which was built in 2015 initially to provide air support to al-Assad against the Syrian opposition. Over time, the airbase has played an important role in Moscow’s operations in Africa.

Iran, on the other hand, deepened its relations during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, driven by the understanding that Tehran and Damascus were opposed to Western interference in the region. Syria became an important route for the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah, part of Iran’s “Shia shield” and “line of resistance”.

Iranian and Russian strategic interests converged in Syria as the war progressed, especially in 2015, when both stepped in to prevent a victory for the opposition.

Russia’s military intervention in 2015 stabilized al-Assad’s regime, aided by Iran-allied forces that played a key role in turning the tide of the conflict.

“The relations between Russia and Iran have been increasing,” Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert with the Russian Foreign Affairs Council, told Al Jazeera. “After 2020, events in Syria have had only a minor impact on Russian-Iranian relations, which have developed in many new ways.”

These include military cooperation, as well as increased economic ties, with Tehran and Moscow working to circumvent Western sanctions through alternative banking and energy deals. Iran has also positioned itself as a critical transport hub in Russia’s North-South Transport Corridor, which provides an important trade route to Asia.

Relations have deepened since the Russia-Ukraine war, in which Russia used Iranian-supplied drones, driven by shared interests in countering the United States’ perceived global presence. Both countries are seeking alternatives to the US-led world order, with Iran looking to Russia as a partner in its pivot to the East.

Iran joins the BRICS group of emerging economies in 2023, a club Russia was already a part of, can be considered as part of this effort. BRICS provides a platform for cooperation, as Iran looks to membership and integration into a multilateral economic organization that aligns with its goals.

“Building a multipolar world and fighting the expansionist agenda of the United States and the united West remain central to Russian-Iranian cooperation,” Semenov said.

It is this approach to the common enemy that has seen Iran and Russia grow closer, said Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs.

“These two sides have taken steps to increase their relationship to some kind of strategic partnership, especially in areas such as military and security cooperation, and recently in economic cooperation, aimed at avoiding sanctions and adapting to the negative effects of economic pressure from Western countries. ,” said Azizi.

Limits of Russian-Iranian partnership

Although the cooperation agreement signed on Friday shows deep cooperation, it does not include a defense clause or create a formal alliance structure, unlike the agreement Russia signed with North Korea last year.

That perhaps reflects the limit in the relationship between Iran and Russia that has already been seen in Syria.

There, Tehran and Moscow could not find common ground and often looked down on each other or could not rise to the challenge of rebuilding the country.

For example, in 2017, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin made it clear that his country would be the only country to rebuild Syria’s energy industry. Iran, eager to reap the benefits of reconstruction in Syria, was blocked by al-Assad and Moscow with one warning from the Iranian parliament that Iran was “surrendered”.

The new administration in Syria could also be a point of difference between Russia and Iran, with Moscow maintaining a path of reconciliation.

Azizi noted that the fall of al-Assad in both Russia and Iran will depend on many variables, including “whether or not there is an agreement or understanding between Russia on the one hand and the US, Turkey, and [the former] Syrian rebels on the other hand, as part of a potentially comprehensive package that includes Syria and Ukraine”.

“For example, if Russia can maintain its military bases in Syria, although it is greatly reduced, and if there is an agreement to end the war in Ukraine after [US President-elect] Donald Trump takes office, Russia may feel the need for Iranian support in different fields in Syria and Ukraine, “Azizi added, although he added that he believes that any important changes in Iran-Russia relations are likely to be given “the increasing depth of cooperation. ” a few years ago.

Divisions are also possible in other areas, especially on the topic of nuclear weapons, which Iran is accused by the West of seeking. Iran’s defense doctrine officially opposes the pursuit of nuclear weapons, but some groups in Iran are now openly calling for that to change after Israel launched several attacks on its allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Russia has historically been involved in Iran’s nuclear program, including the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but repeatedly halted progress throughout the 2000s and 2010s, leaving some in Iran to suspect Russia of being an unreliable partner. Moscow also delayed the delivery of the S-300 missile defense system between 2010 and 2016, due to sanctions imposed on Tehran by Western countries.

“Russia does not want Iran to have nuclear weapons… [that] it would shift the balance of power in the Middle East against Russian interests. “The best scenario for Russia is for Iran to stay under sanctions and challenge the US and Europe with its nuclear program,” said Armin Montazeri, foreign policy editor at Hammihan Daily in Tehran.

“If Russia were to cooperate in containing Iran, it might seek permission from the US on the Ukraine issue,” Montazeri said.

New directions in the Middle East

Geopolitical dynamics can always change depending on the events in the world, as Syria has proven, and in the absence of any strong ideological ties beyond the strategy against the US, the relationship between Iran and Russia can erupt.

The changing nature of the alliance can be seen in Turkey’s opposition to Iran and Russia, and its cooperation with them.

In December 2024, when the Assad regime collapsed, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Russia met on the sidelines of the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The tripartite meeting was called under the Astana process, a diplomatic initiative aimed at controlling the conflict in Syria, where Russia and Iran had acted as facilitators on the side of the regime and Turkey on the opposition.

Astana served as an opportunity for the three powers to work together to achieve security goals in Syria, as they support different sides. But for much of the process, it was Turkiye who was in a weak position, looking at what was seen as a victory for al-Assad in the war.

That has now changed, and it is Turkiye’s long-standing support for the opposition that puts it in power against Iran and Russia, and a channel of influence in Damascus.

It is a new reality they will have to adapt to, said Omer Ozkizilcik, director of Turkish Studies at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul.

“Iran, although it is clearly disadvantaged, will have to adapt to the new reality and establish some kind of relationship with the new Syrian government,” Ozkizilcik said, referring to the near-faulty intelligence the Assad regime had given Iran to operate on Syrian territory.

On the other hand, Russia, while hoping to keep its bases in Syria, is protecting the new reality by turning a little towards Libya, where it has close relations with the eastern government based in Benghazi and Russian cargo planes have made several flights to its territory. – Khadim base.

On the other hand, Iran seems to have retreated from Iraq in an attempt to consolidate its position. There have been reports that it has pushed its allies in Iraq to stop firing rockets and drones at Israel, which may have led to US-Israeli attacks on their territories.

In this context, Iran is likely to strengthen its influence in Iraq, “the last pillars of Iran’s resistance,” Montazeri said.

Iraq’s importance now serves as a financial resource and security bulwark for Tehran, which relies on the country for inter-disciplinary economic support.

Seyed Emamian, founder of the Governance and Policy think tank in Tehran, said that Iran has a history of adapting to changing geopolitical dynamics, and will be able to withstand any changes and maintain its relations with Russia.

However, regardless of the agreements that emerge between Russia and the US after Trump’s inauguration, Iran’s leadership does not expect Putin to significantly change his strategic approach towards Iran.

“Putin is well aware of the anti-Russian atmosphere embedded in American and European institutions,” Emamian said.

“For the past three years, Russia has faced what it sees as an existential challenge from the West … it seems unlikely that Putin would jeopardize his long-standing alliances, especially with those who have proven their loyalty at critical times, such as in Syria and Crimea. ,” Emamian added.