Dreams of a ‘broken’ Russia may turn into a nightmare for the West – and an opportunity for China

Do the names on the map matter? In border areas, the answer is probably “yes.”

In 2023, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources ordered that new maps must use the former Chinese names for their lost territories in what is now the Russian Far East. Vladivostok, home of the headquarters of Russia’s Pacific fleet, became Haishenwai; Sakhalin Island became kuyedao. Then in late August, the ministry released a map showing Russia’s disputed Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island within China’s borders.

The map’s moves came amid growing talk and even calls in Western foreign policy circles for the disintegration of the Russian Federation into many smaller states. The thought is that, breaking up into smaller regions would weaken Russia’s challenge to the West and its ability to fight a war in Ukraine.

As a scholar of Russian regional identity and history, I believe that the prospect of a broken Russia is impossible, to say the least. But talking about the disintegration of Russia and the change in the names of the map touches on topics that should be explored: Is there a greater desire for independence in the remote parts of the Russian region? And if there were to be rebellious states in the Far East, would that benefit the West – or China?

The rise of ‘breakup enhancements’

Those calling for, or predicting, the disintegration of the Russian Federation have grown in numbers since the start of the war in Ukraine. In the book “Failed State: A guide to Russia’s Rapture,” political scientist Janusz Bugajski argues that the territories of the Russian Federation will eventually declare independence – just like when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. This, he and others argue, would be good for everyone outside of Russia. A stronger Russia would “reduce the ability to attack neighbors,” Bugajski said.

David Ignatius of the Washington Post is pessimistic about Russia’s disintegration, writing in August that it would provide a potentially dangerous “devil’s playground” for the West.

Regardless, a growing number of analysts think that, in the words of Russian scholar Alexander J. Motyl, “it’s time to start taking Russia’s potential disintegration seriously.”

Having worked on the history of the Russian region for twenty years, I see great obstacles in the areas that declare independence. It is certainly true that the central authority has been harmful – economically and culturally – to some of the 83 regions of the Russian Federation. But there is a lack of public support for autonomy – that is, the power to decide local and regional affairs within the larger region – let alone full-fledged independence.

Not all regions in Russia are the same. In others, such as Tatarstan and Dagestan, self-government is attractive to many people.

But many of Russia’s regions that want greater independence are located in areas that would make it difficult for them to declare their independence because they are still surrounded by the Russian Federation.

Those in areas more suitable for independence – say, those with borders with neighboring countries – often face other difficulties, such as proximity to China.

In Russia’s Far East, there is concern among potential observers that independence could lead to an interventionist China taking over or at least gaining influence.

Geography problems

“Breakup boosters” – the term I use to describe those who advocate the disintegration of Russia – I assume that the regions of the Russian Federation all have aspirations for independence.

But an analysis of Russian regions by Adam Lenton of Wake Forest University found a highly variable level of support for independence across Russian regions.

The data shows that in many regions that have exiled the freedom leaders and are being talked about as possible to separate, the public does not support that policy.

The data show support for independence rather than independence. Independence will make the Russian Federation a real federation.

The region with the most support for independence is Tatarstan, a republic led by the Turkic-speaking Tatar people 447 kilometers south of Moscow. But to argue that this should lead to independence is absurd – it would be completely surrounded by a hostile Russian Federation. An independent foreign and defense policy in such circumstances is almost impossible.

Some Tatars are also against independence on this issue.

The regions of the North Caucasus have the highest score, and the external border with Georgia makes it a better candidate for independence. But this region has a painful experience with attempts to break away. Chechnya’s attempt at independence failed after a long and bloody war.

In Siberia, the Tuva region has the highest levels of support for independence. But it is in China’s backyard – and this could make it geographically vulnerable.

Russia’s Far East, China’s backyard

The Russian Far East includes the Amur region near the border with China and Vladivostok. These were taken from China by Russia in the middle of the 19th century, when the Russian general Nikolai Murav’ev-Amurskii used large Russian weapons and a modern army to conquer China.

But the land situation in the region remained controversial. In 1969, China and the Soviet Union fought an infamous seven-month war over border issues.

After 1991, China and Russia went through several negotiations and agreements to ensure that the border between them was accepted by both sides, and the last agreement took place in 2004. However, not all groups within China welcome the results.

Chinese textbooks still talk about the loss of 1.5 million square kilometers to Russia and note that Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, said he would “present the bill,” meaning that Russia would have to pay for what Mao saw as the country. property theft.

The fear among some Russians – and those in the West – is that China could turn the Russian Far East into its own satellite, using it as a source of raw materials such as diamonds and gold, as well as oil and gas. And with economic strength comes political influence.

China faces challenges that make expanding its influence in the Russian Far East even more attractive now, including what experts see as an economic crisis and a rural education gap. Spatial expansion can provide economic growth while acting as a distraction from domestic affairs.

But the disintegration of the Russian Federation may pose a security threat to China. The experience of Xinjiang serves as a warning. The region, which has been at the center of China’s persecution of the Muslim Uyghur people, was also a rebel region under the protection of former Soviet leader Josef Stalin.

In addition, the Chinese Communist Party will fear that any unrest in the Russian Federation’s territories near Xinjiang could spill over.

Given all this, the argument from separatist boosters that no one, except President Vladimir Putin, stands to lose if the Russian Federation disintegrates is, I believe, untenable.

And instead of hastening the disintegration of the Russian Federation, polls suggest that the war in Ukraine is having a unifying effect. Many Russians who initially opposed the war have turned to its supporters – in part because of propaganda that emphasized the threat from the West to Russian territory. As of 2021, Russian military doctrine has highlighted this threat, stating that one of the main problems the nation faced were groups “intending to violate the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”

Western calls for the breakup of the Russian Federation may suggest to the Russian public that the fear of Putin’s place may be real. Moreover, dreams of a broken Russian Federation may distract those in the West from the real problem of helping Ukraine protect its territorial integrity.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a non-profit, independent news organization that brings you facts and honest analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. Written by: Susan Smith-Peter, City University of New York

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Susan Smith-Peter receives funding from the Fulbright Program, SRCC, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I volunteer at Razom in Ukraine.